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Adaptationist approaches in evolutionary ecology often take it for granted that natural 
selection maximizes fitness. Consider, for example, the following quotations from 
standard textbooks:  
 
The majority of analyses of life history evolution considered in this book are predicated on two 
assumptions: (1) natural selection maximizes some measure of fitness, and (2) there exist trade-
offs that limit the set of possible [character] combinations. (Roff 1992: 393) 
 
The second assumption critical to behavioral ecology is that the behavior studied is adaptive, that 
is, that natural selection maximizes fitness within the constraints that may be acting on the 
animal. (Dodson et al. 1998: 204) 
 
Individuals should be designed by natural selection to maximize their fitness. This idea can be 
used as a basis to formulate optimality models [...]. (Davies et al. 2012: 81) 
 
Yet there is a long history of scepticism about this idea in population genetics. As A. 
W. F. Edwards puts it:  
 
[A] naive description of evolution [by natural selection] as a process that tends to increase fitness 
is misleading in general, and hill-climbing metaphors are too crude to encompass the 
complexities of Mendelian segregation and other biological phenomena. (Edwards 2007: 353) 
 
Is there any way to reconcile the adaptationist’s image of natural selection as an 
engine of optimality with the more complex image of its dynamics we get from 
population genetics? This has long been an important strand in the controversy 
surrounding adaptationism.1 Yet debate here has been hampered by a tendency to 
conflate various different ways of thinking about maximization and what it entails. In 
this article I distinguish, at a deliberately coarse grain of analysis, four varieties of 
maximization principle.2 I then discuss the logical relations between these varieties, 
arguing that, although they may seem similar at face value, none entails any of the 
others. I then turn briefly to the status of each variety, arguing that, while each type of 
maximization principle faces serious problems, the problems are subtly different for 
each type.  
In the last section, I reflect on what is at stake in this debate. Defenders of fitness 
maximization are often motivated by a desire to defend adaptationist, optimality-
based approaches in evolutionary ecology of the sort described in the quotations at the 
                                                            
1 For excellent introductions to these wider debates, see Lewens (2007, 2009); Godfrey-Smith and 
Wilkins (2008), and Orzack and Forber (2012).  
2 The basic taxonomy here is set out in greater detail in Birch (2016).  
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start of this article. I argue, however, that the value of optimality-based approaches as 
tools for hypothesis generation does not depend on the existence of a universal 
maximization principle describing the action of natural selection. The need for such a 
principle only arises for those who hold a more epistemically ambitious view about 
what these approaches can achieve.  
 
1 Four varieties of maximization 
 
Any maximization principle, to be worthy of the name, must spell out what is meant 
by a fitness maximum, and must assign a special status to such a point in the 
dynamics of evolution by natural selection. This, however, leaves many options open 
regarding the nature of the maximum and its significance in the dynamics. We should 
not be surprised, then, to find many quite different fitness maximization principles in 
evolutionary biology.  
I suggest that two distinctions lead to a useful taxonomy of such principles. First, 
we should distinguish between maximization principles that concern what happens at 
equilibrium and those that concern the direction of change. Second, we should 
distinguish between maximization principles that concern the population mean fitness 
and those that concern the behavioural strategies of individual organisms.  
As a preliminary, I want to introduce Sewall Wright’s (1932) adaptive landscape 
metaphor, to which Edwards alludes in the above quotation. This controversial 
metaphor looms large in debates about fitness maximization. Wright imagined the 
mean fitness of a population moving through a multi-dimensional gene frequency 
space.3 Flattening this space to three dimensions for ease of visualization, he pictured 
a landscape characterized by “adaptive peaks” representing mean fitness maxima, and 
he pictured evolution by natural selection as a “hill-climbing” process that drives a 
population towards the nearest maximum. In this vision of evolution, natural selection 
sometimes drives populations to the highest peak (the global maximum) but it may 
also cause populations to become marooned on local maxima, separated from the 
global maximum by fitness valleys.  
The adaptive landscape metaphor combines two seductive ideas about the 
dynamics of evolution by natural selection: an idea about equilibrium and an idea 
about change. First, it pictures the stationary points of evolution by natural selection 
as points at which mean fitness is maximized, such that any change in the frequency 
of any allele will decrease mean fitness. Second, it pictures a population out of 
population-genetic equilibrium as moving reliably upward, in the direction of greater 
mean fitness.  
                                                            
3 Wright originally envisaged “genotypes [...] packed, side by side [...] in such a way that each is 
surrounded by genotypes that differ by only one gene replacement” (Wright 1988: 116). On such a 
landscape, populations would be represented by clouds of genotypes. But the version of the metaphor 
that now features in standard textbooks represents a population as single point moving through a space 
defined by population gene frequencies (Ridley 2004; Futuyma 2013). See Pigliucci and Kaplan 
(2006); Kaplan (2008) for discussion of the different versions of the metaphor.  
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These two claims are conceptually distinct. To help us keep these ideas separate, 
let us denote them with the labels “MAX-A” and “MAX-B”:  
 
MAX-A (Mean fitness, equilibrium): A population undergoing evolution by 
natural selection is at a stable population-genetic equilibrium if and only if its 
mean fitness is maximized, such that any change in allele frequencies will reduce 
mean fitness. 
 
MAX-B (Mean fitness, change): If a population is not in population-genetic 
equilibrium, then natural selection will reliably change allele frequencies in a 
way that leads to greater mean fitness, even if other factors prevent the 
population from reaching a maximum. 
 
In both MAX-A and MAX-B, the variable that is maximized is the population mean, 
averaged over genotypes or over individuals, of some fitness measure. In this sense, 
MAX-A and MAX-B are population-centred: they focus on the properties and 
dynamics of populations, making no explicit reference to the properties of individuals 
in those populations. But this is not the only way to think about fitness maximization. 
Behavioural ecologists commonly start with the assumption that an individual 
organism will behave as if attempting to maximize its own individual fitness or (in the 
case of social behaviour) its inclusive fitness. They then ask: which strategy, from the 
range of feasible options, would it be rational for the organism to adopt, given its 
apparent goal?  
We can say (following Alan Grafen) that behavioural ecologists who think in this 
way are employing an “individual as maximizing agent” analogy (Grafen 1984, 
1999). Agential thinking of this sort is widespread in many areas of evolutionary 
ecology, including inclusive fitness theory, life history theory and evolutionary game 
theory (e.g. Maynard Smith 1982; Parker and Smith 1990; Davies et al. 2012). The 
analogy does not involve any literal attribution of rational agency to non-human 
organisms. Instead, the thought is that organisms, regardless of their degree of 
cognitive sophistication, can be modelled as if they were rational agents attempting to 
maximize their individual fitness (or inclusive fitness), because natural selection tends 
to lead to equilibria at which organisms adopt strategies that maximize their 
individual fitness (or inclusive fitness) within the set of feasible options. This leads to 
a third conception of fitness maximization:  
 
MAX-C (Individual fitness, equilibrium): A population undergoing evolution 
by natural selection is at a stable population-genetic equilibrium if and only if all 
organisms adopt the phenotype that maximizes their individual fitness (or 
inclusive fitness) within the set of biologically feasible phenotypic options. 
 
This notion of maximization clearly bears some resemblance to MAX-A, in that it 
posits a close relationship between population-genetic equilibria and fitness maxima, 
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but it differs in that it defines these maxima not in terms of the mean fitness of the 
population, but rather in terms of optimal strategy choice, within the set of 
biologically feasible options, on the part of individual organisms (the reference to 
“biologically feasible options” makes it clear that we are talking here about 
optimization subject to constraints, not unconstrained maximization). Despite the 
superficial similarities, this way of thinking about maximization has little to do with 
Wright’s adaptive landscape metaphor. It is much closer to the notion of 
maximization which appears in economics, in which humans are typically modelled 
as rational agents maximizing utility subject to constraints.  
MAX-C, like MAX-A, is a claim about what happens at equilibrium. However, 
the equilibrium/change distinction cross-cuts the mean fitness/individual fitness 
distinction. This leads to our fourth variety, an individual-level analogue of MAX-B 
concerning the direction of change:  
 
MAX-D (Individual fitness, change): If a population is not in population-
genetic equilibrium, then natural selection will reliably drive it in the direction of 
a point at which all organisms adopt the phenotype that maximizes their 
individual fitness (or inclusive fitness) within the set of biologically feasible 
phenotypic options, even if other factors prevent the population from reaching 
this point. 
 
2 Relations between the varieties 
 
We now have four varieties of fitness maximization on the table (Table 1). I claim 
that none of them entails any of others. I will defend this claim piecemeal, looking 
first at the rows in Table 1 and then at the columns. I assume that if there is no 
entailment along the rows or the columns, then there is no serious prospect of 
entailment across the diagonals.  
 
   
 
Equilibrium Change  
   
Mean fitness  MAX-A  MAX-B 
   
Individual fitness MAX-C  MAX-D 
   
    
Table 1: Four varieties of fitness-maximization 
 
The first non-entailment I want to consider concerns the first row. The key points here 
can be expressed in terms of the adaptive landscape metaphor. In principle, it might 
be that adaptive peaks are always stationary points and yet selection might be 
ineffectual at driving populations up slopes towards them. Conversely, selection 
might drive populations reliably upward whenever they are out of equilibrium, and 
yet the population might stably stop at least some of the time at points that are not 
peaks. Hence MAX-A does not entail MAX-B, nor vice versa.  
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The broader point here is that claims about what happens at equilibrium do not 
entail claims about the direction of out-of-equilibrium change, nor vice versa. This 
carries over to the second row. In principle, it might be that a stable stationary point in 
the dynamics of evolution by natural selection occurs if and only if all organisms in 
the population have optimal phenotypes, and yet natural selection is ineffectual at 
driving populations towards such optima. Conversely, selection might reliably drive 
populations towards such optima, only to reach a stable stationary point part way 
there. Hence MAX-C does not entail MAX-D, nor vice versa.  
The columns are a little more subtle. MAX-A does not entail MAX-C, nor vice 
versa, because there can be mean fitness maxima (in allele frequency space) at which 
suboptimal phenotypes are present in the population. MAX-A says that these points 
constitute stable population-genetic equilibria, whereas MAX-C says they do not. 
Consider, for example, the polymorphic equilibrium in the standard model of 
heterozygote advantage, illustrated by the famous case of sickle-cell anaemia and 
malarial resistance. In regions with a high incidence of malaria, an allele that causes 
sickle-cell anaemia in the homozygote (i.e. the genotype with two copies of the allele) 
is nonetheless present at a low frequency at equilibrium because it causes malarial 
resistance in the heterozygote (i.e. the genotype with one copy). In the standard model 
of this situation, the equilibrium is a mean fitness maximum—any change in allele 
frequencies lowers the mean fitness—but it is not a point at which every organism has 
an optimal phenotype within the range of feasible options (Hedrick 2011).  
This suggests that the relationship between MAX-A and MAX-C, far from being 
one of logical entailment, is actually one of logical incompatibility: they imply 
contradictory claims about the status of mean fitness maxima at which suboptimal 
phenotypes are present. However, MAX-A and MAX-C can be made compatible if 
interpreted as claims about different evolutionary timescales. MAX-A-type 
maximization principles have usually been studied and discussed in the context of 
models of short-term “microevolution”, such as the heterozygote advantage model 
discussed above. Yet when applying the “individual as maximizing agent” analogy, 
evolutionary ecologists often have a longer timescale in mind: the timescale of what 
Hans Metz (2011) and Peter Godfrey-Smith (2012) have called “mesoevolution.” The 
idea here is that we should think of the attainment of phenotypic optimality as 
occurring over a timescale long enough for populations to escape short-term 
equilibria, such as the sickle-cell equilibrium, at which suboptimal phenotypes may be 
present. This move is central to Peter Hammerstein’s (1996) “streetcar theory,” which 
I consider below. For now, I simply want to note that MAX-A, read as a claim about 
the equilibria of short-term microevolution, is logically independent of MAX-C, read 
as a claim about the “mesoevolutionary” long run. 
The broader point here is that there is a logical gap between claims about short-
term changes in gene frequency and claims about longer-term phenotypic evolution 
(cf. Wilkins and Godfrey-Smith 2009). This carries over to the second column. Read 
as claims about the direction of short-term change, MAX-B and MAX-D seem to 
disagree about what will happen in cases in which a population stands to increase its 
mean fitness by reducing the frequency of an optimal phenotype. We see this in the 
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sickle-cell model, in which an initially high frequency of malarial resistance is 
reduced by selection, owing to the adverse fitness consequences of the same gene in 
the homozygote. Mean fitness increases, but there is no convergence on universal 
malarial resistance. 
As with MAX-A and MAX-C, however, thinking about timescales can help 
remove this apparent tension. We can read MAX-D as the claim that over the long 
term the dynamics of a population evolving by natural selection will converge on a 
point at which the population realizes an optimal phenotypic profile. This claim about 
long-term convergence is logically independent of MAX-B, read as a claim about the 
short-term direction of change. It is compatible with selection reliably driving a 
population in the direction of greater mean fitness in the short term, even if this 
sometimes means driving it away from phenotypic optimality, provided the 
population converges on phenotypic optimality in the long run. It is also compatible 
with the direction of short-term change in mean fitness being highly variable and 
context-dependent.  
 
3 Status of the varieties: MAX-A and MAX-B 
 
All four varieties of fitness maximization are controversial, but for different reasons. 
Let us start with MAX-A and MAX-B. While these may look innocuous to biologists 
trained to think of evolution in terms of adaptive landscapes, they are contentious in 
population genetics (Ewens 2004; Edwards 2007). MAX-A is challenged by models 
in which evolution stops at a point that, on any reasonable measure of fitness, is not a 
mean fitness maximum, even though natural selection is the only evolutionary process 
at work. Meanwhile, MAX-B is challenged by models in which, on any reasonable 
measure of fitness, natural selection drives the mean fitness of a population 
downwards over time.  
Models of both sorts have a long history in population genetics. In one-locus 
models that satisfy various other assumptions (random mating, frequency-independent 
fitness, selection on viability differences only), the mean fitness does reliably increase 
and stable equilibria do correspond to mean fitness maxima (Scheuer and Mandel 
1959; Mulholland and Smith 1959; Edwards 2000). But relax any of the assumptions 
of these models and the result is no longer valid. A standard citation in this context is 
Moran (1964), who constructed a two-locus model in which mean fitness decreases 
over time, and in which population-genetic equilibrium occurs far from any “adaptive 
peak.” Moran took this result to debunk the very idea of an “adaptive topography.” 
Ewens (1968) and Karlin (1975) reinforced Moran’s conclusions with further results 
along similar lines. The overall message of this work is that both MAX-A and MAX-
B are extremely dubious in the multi-locus case (see also Hammerstein 1996; Eshel et 
al. 1998; Ewens 2004).  
Intuitively, the source of the trouble in multi-locus models is that Mendelian 
segregation, recombination and epistasis complicate the transmission of fitness 
between parents and offspring. Offspring, while resembling their parents on the 
whole, inherit a combination of genes that is not a simple replica of either parent. 
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Consequently, a gene that promotes the fitness of a parent can, on finding itself in a 
new genomic context, detract from the fitness of the offspring by whom it is inherited, 
with adverse consequences for the population mean fitness. Unfortunately, natural 
selection only “sees” whether current bearers of an allele are fitter, on average, than 
non-bearers; it does not “see” what the mean population fitness will be after the 
vagaries of Mendelian inheritance have taken their course.  
In the models referenced above, the fitness of a genotype is assumed to be 
independent of population gene frequencies. Matters are even worse for mean fitness 
maximization when we introduce frequency-dependent genotypic fitness. Here, the 
intuitive problem is that frequency-dependence makes it possible for an allele to be 
selected even when an increase in its frequency would, via knock-on effects on 
genotypic fitness values in the next generation, detract from the mean fitness of the 
population. The moral of over fifty years of work in this area is that, when genotypic 
fitness depends on gene frequency, the mean fitness does not reliably increase and is 
rarely maximized at equilibrium. Indeed, in an early treatment of frequency-
dependence, Sacks (1967) showed that frequency-dependent selection can lead to a 
stable equilibrium that is also a fitness minimum. This point has been underlined by 
recent work in the field of adaptive dynamics, which suggests an important role for 
fitness minimization in evolution. The idea is that mean fitness minima act as 
“evolutionary branching points” at which a population fragments, causing different 
subpopulations to pursue divergent evolutionary trajectories (Geritz and Metz 1998; 
Doebeli and Dieckmann 2000; Doebeli 2011).  
To be clear, the problem these models pose for MAX-A is not simply that the 
population stops at a local maximum rather than finding its way to the global 
maximum. The problem is that the population stops at a point that is not a maximum 
at all, whether local or global. If we insist on employing the “adaptive landscape” 
metaphor in such cases, we should say that the stopping point lies on a “slope” or in a 
“valley” rather than on a “peak.” Likewise, note that the problem these models pose 
for MAX-B is not simply that the “uphill push” of natural selection is counteracted by 
other causes of gene frequency change. The problem is that, even when there is no 
cause of gene frequency change other than natural selection, the mean fitness still 
decreases.  
 
4 Fisher’s fundamental theorem 
 
From Wright onwards, defenders of MAX-B have often cited R. A. Fisher’s 
fundamental theorem of natural selection (Fisher 1930, 1941) in support of their 
claims, even though Fisher himself never regarded the theorem as a maximization 
principle (Edwards 1994). The theorem states that the rate of change in the mean 
fitness in a population “ascribable to a change in gene frequency” is equal to the 
additive genetic variance in fitness. Although there has long been uncertainty over its 
mathematical validity, later reconstructions show clearly that it is a correct result, 
given a particular interpretation of what Fisher meant by the rate of change 
“ascribable to a change in gene frequency” (Price 1972; Ewens 1989; Lessard 1997). 
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Since variance cannot be negative, the theorem seems at first glance to imply that the 
rate of change in mean fitness cannot be negative either, apparently contradicting the 
results Moran and others have obtained in specific models.  
A lot depends, however, on what is packed into Fisher’s rather obscure concept of 
a rate of change “ascribable to a change in gene frequency.” In informal terms, the 
quantity that Fisher proved can never be negative is a quantity that captures what the 
total rate of change in mean fitness would be, if we could hold the average effects of 
alleles on fitness at their current values as natural selection changes their frequencies. 
The trouble is that, except in cases of perfectly additive genetics (no dominance, 
epistasis or linkage), the average effects of alleles depend on genotype frequencies, 
and therefore on allele frequencies, and therefore on the action of natural selection. So 
as natural selection changes allele frequencies, it changes the average effects of 
alleles, creating a gap between the total rate of change in mean fitness and the 
“partial” rate of change with which Fisher’s fundamental theorem is concerned.  
There is in fact no theoretical guarantee that the total rate of change in mean 
fitness will be non-negative. To use a potentially misleading metaphor, the picture we 
get from the fundamental theorem, when we interpret it correctly, is of natural 
selection pushing the population “uphill” with one hand while it reshapes the 
landscape with the other. The total action of natural selection may leave the 
population higher, lower or at the same level, depending on the details. Of course, as 
Moran (1964) pointed out, this arguably casts doubt on the utility of the adaptive 
landscape metaphor.4  
 
5 Status of the varieties: MAX-C and MAX-D 
 
MAX-C-type maximization principles, which switch the focus from the population 
mean fitness to individual phenotypes and their fitness consequences, have two main 
cards up their sleeve to help them deal with the traditional problem cases for MAX-A 
and MAX-B. First, in cases of strategic interaction, an equilibrium that is not a mean 
fitness maximum can still be reconciled with MAX-C, as long as it is a Nash 
equilibrium. For, at a Nash equilibrium, organisms are best-response maximizers: 
they adopt the phenotype (or a phenotype, in cases of weak Nash equilibrium) that is 
fitness-optimal conditional on the phenotypes of their social partners. This is true 
even if the Nash equilibrium is a mean fitness minimum.  
Second, polymorphic equilibria in which one of the phenotypes present is clearly 
suboptimal, such as the sickle-cell equilibrium, can be reconciled with MAX-C 
provided MAX-C is understood as a claim about the stable equilibria of long-term 
phenotypic evolution, not the stable equilibria of short-term gene frequency change. 
The key here is to adopt a particularly demanding conception of stability when 
defining a stable equilibrium of long-term phenotypic evolution, so that sickle-cell 
                                                            
4 See Price 1972; Ewens 1989; Frank and Slatkin 1992; Frank 1997; Edwards 1994; Ewens 2004; 
Plutynski 2006; Okasha 2008; Ewens 2011; Edwards 2014; Grafen 2015; Ewens and Lessard 2015; 
Birch 2016 for further detail on, and discussion of, these complex issues.  
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type polymorphic equilibria do not qualify as stable. Crucially, the sickle-cell 
equilibrium is vulnerable to invasion by a mutant that produces malarial resistance in 
the heterozygote without producing sickle-cell anaemia in the homozygote. So if we 
define stability in terms of resistance to invasion in the long run, this equilibrium may 
not be stable after all.  
Peter Hammerstein’s (1996) “streetcar theory” has been particularly influential in 
this context (see also Eshel and Feldman 1984, 2001; Liberman 1988; Hammerstein 
and Selten 1994; Eshel et al. 1998; Hammerstein 2012). On Hammerstein’s picture, 
“an evolving population resembles a streetcar in the sense that it may reach several 
temporary stops that depend strongly on genetic detail before it reaches a final stop 
which has higher stability properties and is mainly determined by selective forces at 
the phenotypic level” (Hammerstein 1996: 512). The “final stop,” he argues, will be a 
Nash equilibrium. Hence we arrive at a tenable version of MAX-C, provided we 
interpret “stable” equilibria as only those which correspond to Hammerstein’s “final 
stops” achieved in the evolutionary long run, as opposed to the “stops along the way” 
described by standard microevolutionary theory.5 
Hammerstein’s argument, however, does not establish (nor attempt to establish) 
MAX-D: it characterizes a special sort of long-term stable equilibrium and shows that 
it corresponds to a fitness maximum in a certain sense, but it does not give us a reason 
to think that a population evolving by natural selection will reliably converge towards 
such a point. This is ultimately an empirical matter, because it depends on the rate of 
mutation and the rate at which the selective environment changes. As Ilan Eshel and 
Marcus Feldman note, arguments of this general sort predict optimal outcomes in the 
long run only if “the regime of selection acting on the trait under study remains 
invariant during the slow process of transitions between genetic [i.e. short-term] 
equilibria” (Eshel and Feldman 2001: 186). By contrast, “for shorter-lived processes 
of conflict (e.g. in a newly colonized niche) we expect the population to be close to a 
short-term stable equilibrium, but not to one that is long-term stable” (Eshel and 
Feldman 2001: 186).  
In light of this, it also seems clear that the streetcar theory, although it does 
provide support for a specific, long-term version of MAX-C, does not support the idea 
that natural selection has any tendency to maximize fitness in the absence of other 
causes of gene frequency change. On the contrary, the argument concedes that natural 
selection often will not be able to do so unless another cause of gene frequency 
change, viz. mutation, is powerful enough to circumvent genetic barriers to optimality 
(cf. Sober 1987). So, to the extent that the streetcar theory supports a version of 
adaptationism, it is a version that recognizes the importance of both mutation and 
selection in determining evolutionary outcomes.  
 
                                                            
5 This argument does not, however, give us a tenable version of MAX-A, since a Nash equilibrium 
need not be a mean fitness maximum.  
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6 Formal Darwinism 
 
This is where Alan Grafen’s on-going “Formal Darwinism” project enters the scene 
(Grafen 2002, 2006, 2007, 2014). Grafen aims to show that, even in models in which 
we assume the absence of mutation6, there are strong formal links between population 
genetic equilibrium and phenotypic optimality, where the optimal phenotype is 
defined as that which maximizes inclusive fitness within a set (X) of specified 
alternative options.  
The assuming away of mutation in Grafen’s models marks one important 
difference with Hammerstein’s project. The other notable difference is that Grafen’s 
formal links concern the direction of short-term change as well as the nature of long-
term equilibrium. In broad terms, what Grafen has shown is that, across a wide range 
of (mutation-free) models, a population is at a point at which there is no “scope for 
selection” (roughly, no expected change in any gene frequency) and no “potential for 
positive selection” (roughly, no phenotype in X that is selected-for or that would be 
selected-for if present) if and only if all organisms have the optimal phenotype in X. 
He also proves links (which I will not discuss here) concerning changes in gene 
frequency in populations in which some or all individuals are suboptimal. Grafen 
(2014: 166) glosses these results as showing that “there is a very general expectation 
of something close to fitness maximization, which will convert into fitness 
maximization unless there are particular kinds of circumstances.” 7  
I have criticized the Formal Darwinism project on other occasions, and I cannot 
do justice to this complex topic here (Birch 2014, 2016). I will, however, explain 
briefly why I think that some of Grafen’s informal glosses, such as that in the above 
quotation, overstate the implications of his formal results for fitness maximization. 
We should first ask: which varieties of maximization are at stake? The 
maximization in which Grafen is interested is the maximization of individual fitness 
by individual phenotypes: it does not directly involve population means. In effect, he 
claims to have shown that versions of MAX-C and MAX-D would be true in a world 
without mutation (and in which various other idealizations he makes in his models, 
                                                            
6 The key assumptions of Grafen’s framework are that there is “no mutation, no gametic selection, fair 
meiosis and that all the loci contributing to the p-score have the same mode of inheritance” (Grafen 
2002: 82). I previously described the absence of mutation as a “limitation” of the framework (Birch 
2016), but I now suspect that this not the right way to think about it. A more charitable reading is that 
Grafen intentionally assumes away mutation in the hope of proving links between selection and 
optimality that do not rely on assumptions about mutation, as Hammerstein’s (1996) results do.  
7 Others cite Grafen in support of stronger claims. See, for example, West and Burton-Chellew (2013: 
1043): “The success of the behavioral ecology approach is built on an extremely solid theoretical 
grounding (Davies et al. 2012). Darwin (1859) argued that traits that increase fitness will accumulate in 
populations, leading to organisms that behave as if they are trying to maximize their fitness. Our 
modern most general genetical interpretation of this is that organisms should behave as if they are 
trying to maximize their inclusive fitness (Hamilton 1964; Grafen 2006).”  
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such as the absence of meiotic drive and gametic selection, also obtain). Here I will 
focus on MAX-C.8 
A natural reaction to this claim is to ask: how could MAX-C possibly be true in a 
world without mutation? Assuming away mutation seems to make things worse, not 
better, for fitness maximization. For in a world without mutation, there is no way to 
get around the constraints imposed by genetic architecture. A population can get 
permanently stuck at a sickle-cell type polymorphic equilibrium at which suboptimal 
phenotypes are present. Yet Grafen proves that all of his formal links between gene 
frequency change and optimal strategy choice still hold in such a context. This is 
surprising at face value, and it leaves two possibilities: either these cases are not really 
incompatible with MAX-C after all, despite the apparent presence of suboptimal 
phenotypes, or else Grafen’s formal links do not really imply a version of MAX-C 
after all, even though his informal gloss suggests they do.  
It takes a bit of untangling to see what is going on here (Grafen 2014; Okasha and 
Paternotte 2014; Birch 2016). The key is to see that Grafen’s links do not explicitly 
refer to population-genetic equilibrium: instead, they characterize an equilibrium as a 
point at which there is no “scope for selection” and no “potential for positive 
selection”. It turns out that the sickle-cell equilibrium does not qualify as an 
equilibrium in this sense, because there is a phenotype—malarial resistance—that is 
being selected-for. By characterizing evolutionary equilibrium in partly phenotypic 
terms, Grafen is able to disqualify equilibria in which gene frequencies are stably 
constant but suboptimal phenotypes are present.  
However, this unorthodox way of thinking about equilibrium has some odd 
consequences. For example, an initial population composed of 100% heterozygotes, 
all with the optimal malarial resistance phenotype, qualifies as an equilibrium in the 
sense that matters for Grafen’s links. It qualifies because it has no expected change in 
gene frequencies in the initial time step and no phenotype that is or would be selected-
for, even though selection will inevitably start altering gene frequencies as soon as 
homozygotes appear (Grafen 2014).  
As Grafen himself notes, the way in which the links hold in cases of heterozygote 
advantage “seem[s] to contain an element of evasion, and call[s] into question the 
meaning and value of the links themselves” (Grafen 2014: 165). The question is what 
this means for the relationship between the links and our MAX-C. Here is one way to 
go: MAX-C is clearly false in sickle-cell type models without mutation, but Grafen’s 
links are true; so, despite appearing at face value to do so, Grafen’s links do not imply 
MAX-C. This is the response I advocated on an earlier occasion (Birch 2016).  
However, there is, I think, is another way of reading this: a way more sympathetic 
to Grafen’s aims. This is to say that Grafen, like Hammerstein, has found a way of 
constructing a non-standard equilibrium concept so that equilibria at which 
suboptimal phenotypes are present do not qualify as equilibria. The novelty of 
Grafen’s approach is to appeal to phenotypic considerations in constructing the 
                                                            
8 Similar considerations complicate the relationship between Grafen’s links and MAX-D, though I will 
not discuss this issue here. 
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equilibrium concept, where Hammerstein appeals to assumptions about the rate of 
mutation and the long-run malleability of genetic architectures. If we formulate 
MAX-C using Grafen’s non-standard equilibrium concept, then it comes out true (see 
“MAX-C**” in Birch 2016). What remains up for debate is whether evolution by 
natural selection has any reliable tendency to arrive at equilibria, thus construed.  
 
7 Living without maximization 
 
For both Hammerstein and Grafen, the project of pursuing fitness maximization 
principles, in the face of widespread skepticism from population geneticists, is 
justified by the need to provide a theoretical foundation for adaptationist, optimality-
based approaches in behavioural ecology (and evolutionary ecology more generally). 
The same need is clearly felt by those behavioural ecologists who have pounced on 
Grafen’s links (too hastily, in my view) as providing “an extremely solid theoretical 
grounding” for the field (West and Burton-Chellew 2013: 1043).  
What drives this need? Why can’t behavioural ecologists simply accept the 
message from population genetics that the dynamics of natural selection are messy 
and complicated, and revise their models accordingly? The problem with this 
suggestion is that the vast majority of work in behavioural ecology relies on what 
Grafen (1984) has termed “the phenotypic gambit”: the bet that the evolution of 
complex phenotypes can be understood in ignorance of the complex genetic 
architectures that underlie them. Approaches as diverse as inclusive fitness theory, life 
history theory, multi-level selection theory and evolutionary game theory all have this 
much in common.  
The precise nature of the gambit varies depending on the details of the approach: 
for example, the inclusive fitness approach aims to understand the evolution of a trait 
by looking at its fitness effects on an organism and its social partners, the patterns of 
genetic relatedness between social partners, and the trait’s heritability. Maximization-
based techniques are often employed, but need not be. In virtually all cases, however, 
researchers make a fundamental bet that they can explain evolutionary outcomes 
without detailed knowledge of the genotype-phenotype map. The rationale for this bet 
is a practical one. We may be living in a “post-genomic” age, but, for the vast 
majority of traits in the vast majority of species, we still lack the sort of data 
concerning the genetic architectures underlying complex behaviour that ecologists 
would need in order to do without the phenotypic gambit. This is what drives the 
desire to show that the long-term equilibria of the evolutionary process are governed 
by, in Hammerstein’s words, “selective forces at the phenotypic level,” which can be 
understood in the absence of detailed knowledge of genetics.  
There is, I think, a real danger that this holy grail of foundational work in 
behavioural ecology will prove mythical. The early models of Moran and others 
should already be enough to convince us that there can be no purely theoretical 
guarantee that evolutionary equilibria will be fitness maxima. This inevitably depends 
on the ability of mutation to alter genetic arrangements. There may be nothing further 
to say here except that sometimes this happens and sometimes it doesn’t. In some 
 13 
cases, the genetic architecture underlying a trait will preclude its optimization; 
sometimes it will be favourable. Sometimes an unfavourable architecture will be 
made more favourable by a change in the genetics; in other cases it may persist longer 
than the selective environment. It all depends on the details.  
I suggest, however, that we can make peace with the phenotypic gambit without 
having to deny the dependence of real-world evolutionary outcomes on genetic detail. 
The key is to recognize that, while the gambit really is a gambit—an opening bet—
and not a “solid theoretical grounding” for which we have compelling independent 
evidence, it not always problematic to rest a scientific research programme on a bet of 
this sort. This depends on the epistemic ambitions of the programme. If optimality 
modelling aims to yield, by itself, knowledge of the evolutionary processes that have 
shaped phenotypic traits, then its reliance on a bet is indeed a problem. For this 
suggests that, even when the hypotheses it generates are true, they are only luckily 
true (i.e., true because the assumptions of the phenotypic gambit happened to be true 
in this case), and this undermines the idea that they constitute knowledge.  
However, if we see the goal of optimality-based approaches as primarily one of 
hypothesis generation, the reliance on a bet is unproblematic.9 After all, it is a bet that 
has led consistently to the generation of serious and credible evolutionary 
hypotheses—hypotheses that are plausible given everything we currently know. This 
is not a trivial achievement. The phenotypic gambit, in all its forms, represents a very 
well designed heuristic for this purpose. On the one hand, it permits modellers to 
idealize away potential complications about which they are unavoidably ignorant, 
while, on the other hand, it demands sensitivity to the knowable empirical facts about 
fitness effects, population structure, heritabilities, coefficients of relatedness and so 
on.  
The upshot is that whether optimality modellers should be worried about the 
absence of a theoretical justification for fitness maximization depends on the function 
they intend their models to serve. The lack of such a justification challenges more 
epistemically ambitious claims about their function, but it does not undermine their 
value as sources of credible empirical hypotheses: hypotheses that should not be 
regarded as knowledge until the underlying genetic architecture of the trait in 
question—and its compatibility or otherwise with the hypothesis—is known.10  
                                                            
9 Alexandrova (2008) argues that we should understand models in experimental economics as tools for 
hypothesis generation and constructs a detailed account of how this works. Roughly, the idea is that 
models provide “open formulae” for causal hypotheses: they generate schemas for causal hypotheses 
that do not assert anything until we add either a quantifier or a singular instance. I suspect this sort of 
account would fit many optimality models in evolutionary ecology quite well, but I do not pursue this 
in detail here. 
10 In a similar vein, Potochnik (2009) distinguishes strong and weak uses of optimality models, where 
the “strong use” involves the claim that selection was the only important influence on the evolution of 
the trait, and the “weak use” involves the weaker claim that model accurately represents the role played 
by selection in the evolution of the trait. However, even Potochnik’s “weak use” strikes me as an 
epistemically ambitious use, since it relies on the idea that optimality models “accurately represent the 
selection dynamics involved in producing the target evolutionary outcome” (Potochnik 2009: 187). My 
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I suspect many evolutionary ecologists would want to resist this epistemically 
modest conception of the function of optimality modelling. But I think we can 
embrace it while still recognizing the scientific value of this kind of work. Serious and 
credible evolutionary hypotheses are hard to find, and we should not be dismissive of 
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